Research on the Pricing Mechanism of Grid-side Energy Storage Power Stations from the Perspective of Value Discovery

doi:10.11985/2023.04.030

Abstract

Abstract:

The grid-side energy storage power stations can better exert the cluster effect and promote the consumption of new energy. But the large-scale application can easily form an alliance to generate market power, which is not conducive to market development. It has been proved in theory and practice that the node marginal electricity price cannot meet the requirements of incentive compatibility, individual rationality and social welfare maximization for energy pricing mechanism at the same time when the market clears. Therefore, based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG) mechanism design theory, an energy pricing mechanism is proposed for grid-side energy storage power stations to participate in the market to reduce the impact of market power and discover the greatest value of energy storage power plants. Firstly, a day-ahead market clearing model that comprehensively considers the cost of energy storage is established with the goal of minimizing the purchase cost of electricity. Secondly, a bidding mechanism for grid-side energy storage power stations based on the VCG mechanism design theory is proposed to promote rational quotation, achieve optimal allocation of power resources. And it is theoretically proved that the proposed mechanism has the market attributes of incentive compatibility, individual rationality and social welfare maximization. Finally, empirical analysis is carried out based on the improved IEEE 30 node system, it is verified that the mechanism effectively reduces market power and this mechanism overcomes the strategic bidding behavior of the grid side energy storage alliance under the nodal marginal price energy pricing mechanism, and realizes the maximization of market social welfare and effective day-ahead market operation.

Key words: Grid-side energy storage system, VCG mechanism, market power, individual rationality, incentive compatibility, maximization of social welfare

CLC Number:

TM561

HE Yang, LU Yao, LI Zhiheng, YANG Meng, YIN Shuo, LI Qian, JIANG Xin. Research on the Pricing Mechanism of Grid-side Energy Storage Power Stations from the Perspective of Value Discovery[J]. Journal of Electrical Engineering, 2023, 18(4): 278-287.

Figures/Tables 17

References 29

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机组	P_g_max/MW	P_g_min/MW	a/(元/MW²)	b/(元/MW)	c/元	接入节点位置
G1	157	45	0.19	201.98	5 249.99	5
G2	100	35	0.16	210.8	6 217.66	8
G3	80	20	0.53	230.8	8 292.85	11
C1	60	10	—	—	—	13

报价	G1	G2	G3	G4	ESS
调频容量报价/元	110	100	80	70	95
调频里程报价/元	4.5	5.8	6	5	3

时刻	价格/元	时刻	价格/元
1:00	4.0	13:00	1.5
2:00	4.2	14:00	1.8
3:00	4.5	15:00	2.3
4:00	4.3	16:00	2.7
5:00	4.0	17:00	2.9
6:00	3.9	18:00	3.1
7:00	3.2	19:00	3.2
8:00	3.0	20:00	3.3
9:00	2.8	21:00	3.5
10:00	2.4	22:00	3.5
11:00	2.1	23:00	3.7
12:00	1.6	24:00	3.9